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Abstract
Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from
the mid-1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since
then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in
pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown
that workers’ heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage
inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We
also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli
di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry-wide collective
bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude
that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely
channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial
relations.
1. Introduction
Wage inequalities rose in most Western countries during the last decades
of the past century. Several theories link this growth in the dispersion of
the pay structure to market forces. Katz and Murphy (1992) were among
the first to attribute the growth in US wage inequality to the demand and
supply of workers’ skills. Similarly, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) show that
several innovations in the production process may have disrupted routine-
based occupations over time, leading to a more polarized structure of
the workforce. Even if theories linking wage dispersion to market forces
highlight important mechanisms and have several merits, they do not always
accurately predict the substantial heterogeneity in wage inequality trends
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observed not only between Europe and the English-speaking countries (e.g.
Blau and Kahn 1996; Koeniger et al. 2007), but also within Continental
Europe (e.g. Hipo´lito 2010). Given that many of these economies share fairly
similar characteristics in terms of trade openness, educational attainments
and production technologies, such evidence suggests that labour market
institutions could be as important as supply and demand factors in shaping
pay differentials and that their influence on the wage structure should be
carefully considered. In this regard, several studies indicate that declining
minimum wages and union strength (e.g. Di Nardo et al. 1996), or changes
in social norms (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2003) could be the main drivers of the
observed secular rise in wage differentials.
A more recent literature, based on matched worker–firm databases, has
suggested that a large part of the increase in wage inequality is between-
rather than within-firms (see the evidence in Barth et al. 2016 for the USA,
and in Faggio et al. 2010 for the United Kingdom). One important factor
behind the rise of the between-firm component appears to be related to
rising heterogeneity in the wage policies of observationally similar firms. In
particular, Card et al. (2013) show that firm-specific components of the wage
variance explain up to one-fourth of the inequality growth that occurred in
West Germany between the late-1980s and the beginning of the new century.
In studying the dynamics of between-plants wage dispersion, several
authors have focused on market-driven explanatory mechanisms, such as
investments in computer technology (e.g. Dunne et al. 2004), dispersion in
productivity (e.g. Barth et al. 2016; Faggio et al. 2010) and international
trade (e.g. Helpman et al. 2017). Others have instead attributed the rise in
the dispersion of firms’ wage premiums to the changes that have occurred
in wage setting institutions. In interpreting their results, Card et al. (2013)
argue that changes that have occurred in the wage bargaining system since
the early-1990s, namely the possibility for German firms of opting-out from
national contractual agreements, may have driven up between-plants wage
differentials. Dustmann et al. (2014) argue that this decentralization in the
wage setting process has made it possible to cut unit labour costs and
to improve international competitiveness, fostering the German economic
growth observed in the last decade.
The aim of our article is to show the importance of collective bargaining in
driving the developments of wage inequality in another large manufacturing
and export-oriented EU economy: Italy. It also seeks to draw comparisons
with (West) Germany, a country similar to Italy in many respects. Although
both countries have been exposed to similar forces related to globalization and
technological change, we show that developments inwage inequality have been
different in important respects (e.g. the role of firm wage policies). We then
argue that the specificities of Italian institutions have a close bearing on these
results.
To conduct our comparative analysis, we apply the methodology of Card
et al. (2013) and rely on similar matched employer–employee data. The
main dataset used covers the entire population of private-sector workers
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and firms in a major region of the country: Veneto. For our purposes, this
sample has a number of advantages. First, Veneto is a relatively self-contained
labour market, emblematic of a manufacturing-oriented economy, highly
exposed to international competition and technological change. As such, its
trends in inequalities are less affected by regional differences in economic
performance, sectoral composition and internal migration; differences that
can be particularly large between the north and south of the country. On the
other hand, the features and dispositions of the Italian system of industrial
relations are uniform across regions. Second, the Veneto data provide us with
the longest currently available dataset to document the long-run evolution
in wage inequality. Finally, we show that the main trends in wage inequality
and regression decomposition exercises, when computed on the smaller, more
homogeneous and manageable Veneto dataset, are very similar to results
derived from a much larger (but shorter and heterogeneous) dataset covering
the entire Italian country.
We first document the episodic nature of the increase in Italian wage
inequality. Inequality in Veneto (and in Italy) diminished in the 1970s,
increased from the early-1980s until the early 2000s, and has been relatively
constant until the present day. Focusing on the male sample and on the
period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion, we then study the evolution
of the following components of inequalities: time-varying characteristics of
the workforce, time-constant individual characteristics and firm-specific wage
premiums, along with the contribution arising from the correlation between
them. We finally introduce a variance decomposition technique designed
to measure the influence of wage setting institutions on the pay structure.
In particular, we test whether the growth of different components of wage
inequality have occurred mostly within or between the fine job title categories
defined and protected by the country’s collective bargaining institutions. Our
data provide reliable information on these job titles at the worker level, but
only until 2004. This is, however, not a major limitation of the analysis, as the
job-title data cover precisely the only period in which Italian wage inequality
was increasing.1
Studying the period from the 1980s until the early 2000s, which is
characterized by a similar growth in pay dispersion between Italy and
Germany, we show that, differently from the results documented by Card
et al. (2013), there has been no growth in firms’ wage premiums dispersion
in the Italian case. Thus, our evidence suggests that Italian highly centralized
sector-wide wage setting mechanisms have not undergone the same renewal
processes characterizing the German labour market during the 1990s, and
that consequently Italian firms have been unable to opt out, or diverge in any
other significant way, from the wage dynamics established within the relevant
industry-wide collective agreements.
A large proportion of the growth of Italian pay dispersion is due to
rising heterogeneity in the portable component of a worker’s pay. This is
the part of the wage attributable to individual-specific characteristics equally
rewarded across employers. In principle, a growing contribution of workers’
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heterogeneity to the total wage variance may simply reflect the underlying
dynamics of supply and demand factors. However, we show that, in practice,
this component of inequality is closely linked to the wage pay scales bargained
at the industry level by the main union confederations and employers’
associations. Hence, we interpret the finding of rising workers’ heterogeneity
as yet another outcome induced by the Italian system of industrial relations,
which seems to impose significant constraints on wage dynamics.
To substantiate our claim, we divide the variance of (log) wages and of
workers’ portable pay components into a within- and a between-job titles part.
These job titles (called livelli di inquadramento in Italian) are occupations,
defined by the relevant sectoral collective agreements, for which a specific
minimum wage applies regardless of a worker’s union membership. We find
that the growth in the between-variance component virtually explains the
entire inequality trend observed in the data; evidence that, partly due to data
limitations in past research on Italian wage inequality, has never previously
been so extensively documented.
Our analysis also shows that another important component of the growth in
wage inequality has been more positive sorting between firms’ pay premiums
and the human capital of the workforce. While part of this growth may simply
be an indirect consequence of increased dispersion in workers’ portable wage
components, it is also tempting to associate the improved assortativematching
with the general labour market modernization and deregulations experienced
by Italy since the mid-1980s.
2. Institutional context
During the entire period considered in this study, and largely still today,
Italy has been characterized by a wage setting mechanism fairly centralized
at the sector-wide national level. Collective contracts are de facto binding
for all employers and all workers, irrespective of union membership. Such
agreements are signed (typically every two years) by the major trade unions
and employers’ associations at the industry-wide level. It is important to note
that there are no opting-out clauses in the Italian system. That is to say, firms
cannot decide to resort to firm-level contractual agreements derogating to the
wage standards settled at the sectoral level. Regional- or firm-level agreements
can only distribute top-up wage components, typically related to indicators of
profitability or productivity.
Each industry-wide collective contract regulates specific job titles (livelli
di inquadramento) and the contractual minimum wages that is to apply for
each of them. Such livelli di inquadramento are job classifications defined
by collective bargaining agreements, which are based on the complexity of
workers’ tasks and, in some circumstances, also on qualifications and seniority
levels. It follows that such job titles can be considered similar to occupations,
with the important differences that, depending on the sector of activity, the
same type of job may be classified in more than one livello di inquadramento
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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FIGURE 1
Long-Run Evolution of Gross Weekly Wage Standard Deviation in Veneto.
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Source: Veneto Worker Histories data for the period 1976–1983. From the year 1984 (denoted by
the hollow circle in the figure), the series is derived from universe of Italian social security records
(VisitINPS data) and computed considering only firms located in Veneto.
and that for each of these groups, a sector-specific binding minimum wage
applies.
In 1993, a major reform of collective bargaining was approved. Its purpose
was to achieve the following main objectives (Casadio 2003): (i) coordination
across industries and moderation on wage growth to achieve low inflation
targets; (ii) growth of regional differences in wages to adapt them better
to the heterogeneous cost of living and labour market conditions at the
local level; (iii) distribution of premiums related to performance (on top
of the sectoral minimums) and negotiation at the firm-level of some other
contractual provisions not related to compensation. This reform resulted in an
increase of geographical differences in the top-up components of negotiated
wages. However, Devicienti et al. (2008) find that, overall, the amount of
flexibility in bargaining agreements introduced by the 1993 reform has been
quite limited. In particular, using a sample covering around 60 per cent of
national private-sector contracts, these authors show that the average share
of all top-up components over total wages increased from around 18 per cent
during the mid-1980s, to only 22 per cent by the end of the 1990s.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the long-run evolution of the standard
deviation of log weekly wages, computed from the social security records
of male private-sector workers in Veneto (the data are presented in the
next section). It is apparent that inequalities declined sharply until around
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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1983. Previous research has attributed this remarkable trend to the strong
compressing effects of the ScalaMobile (e.g. Leonardi et al. 2015; Manacorda
2004).
The Scala Mobile was a cost-of-living allowance added quarterly to the
bargained contractual minimum wages. The institution was in place from the
1970s until 1993, but was weakened and extensively reformed in 1984 and then
through a referendum in 1985. Since this wage-adjustment mechanism had
been particularly disadvantageous for more qualified white collars and skilled
workers, from 1987 on most nation-wide collective bargaining agreements
attempted to mitigate its egalitarian effects further. As a consequence, the
compensations associated with the qualifications embedded in each livello
di inquadramento were improved, widening the gaps in the minimum wages
stipulated for each of these job titles (this tendency is highlighted by industrial
relations reports of the time, such as CESOS 1989). Figure 1 shows indeed
that the period between the early-1980s and early 2000s, the one on which we
focus our analysis, was instead characterized by a very persistent growth in
pay inequality. Note, however, that during the most recent years, as overall
wage dispersion has reached levels similar to those of the 1970s (before the
introduction of the Scala Mobile), this trend of growth has actually stopped.
3. Data and preliminary evidence on inequality
Choice of the Data and of the Time Period
The Veneto Working Histories (VWH) database, which is studied here,
contains earnings data from social security records for all dependent workers
of the private sector in the Veneto region. The database covers the population
of private-sector firms that are registered in one ofVeneto’s INPS agencies, and
the population of their employees. The careers of workers in these firms are
also observed if they have job spells outside the Veneto region, as long as they
are working in the private sector. They are instead not observed if they work
in the public sector or are self-employed. To analyse a more homogeneous
and consistent sample across time, we have divided the data by gender and,
throughout this article, we discuss only results obtained among men. This
choice enables us to compare our results more easily with evidence available in
other studies (most notably Card et al. 2013) and it eases their interpretation,
given that the dynamic of female labour force participation is quite different
from that of men.
Veneto represents a particularly informative case study for our purposes.
This region has a well-developed manufacturing sector, close-to-natural
unemployment rates, limited out-migration; and it is fairly large, given that
its economy represents around 10 per cent of the national GDP. These
features make it quite comparable to other well-developedWestern economies
exposed to international competition and technological advances, most
notably West Germany. Studying inequalities considering only one region of
Italy is convenient also because different rates of economic growth have been
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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FIGURE 2
Standard Deviation of Log Daily Wages in Italy and Veneto.
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observed across the country (particularly between the North and the South)
and it can be difficult to account for genuine adjustments of wages to local
market conditions. In this regard, Devicienti et al. (2008) show that, after the
1993 industrial relations reform, wages started to adapt better to economic
conditions at the regional level, leading to a tenuous resurrection of the Italian
wage curve.
The original version of VWH covers the period from 1975 to 2001, and
hence would not allow us to document the developments in wage inequality
for the most recent years. However, we argue that neither the focus on a single
region nor that on the period that ends in the early 2000s are significant
limitations for the article’s aims and analysis.
To show that this is indeed the case, we complement our analysis based
on VWH with evidence from the recently available country-level matched
employer–employee VisitINPS database, which contains the universe of
Italian social security records for private-sector employees.2 This allows us
both to compute inequality in Veneto for the extended 1975–2015 period (as
in our Figure 1), and to compare wage inequality developments in Veneto and
in Italy across the (shorter) 1983–2015 period.
We can summarize some initial evidence obtained from the two databases
as follows. First, the main inequality trends observed in Veneto are similar
to those obtained from the national population of social security records.
Figure 2 compares the standard deviation of daily wages observed in Italy
and in Veneto, as derived from the VisitINPS data. In computing both series,
we have selected job spells longer than four months and excluded wages below
the first and above the 99th percentiles. The level of this statistic is lower when
computed considering only Veneto’s firms, a finding mostly attributable to
the large regional differences in economic conditions across Italy. However,
when considering the trend in wage dispersion, which is provided in the right
panel of the figure, a fairly similar pattern between the two series emerges.
Second, according to Figure 2, in both Veneto and Italy wage, dispersion
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increases quite persistently from the early-1980s up until the early 2000s, but
this trend is followed by a period of flat or negative growth until the most
recent years. Therefore, the years more carefully studied in this work (from the
early-1980s until the early 2000s) coincide with the only episode of growth in
inequalities observed in Italy since the 1970s. Arguably, this also represents the
most interesting period for an analysis of the evolution of the wage structure
in the Italian case. Finally, as we show in Section 4, also the trends in the
various AKMvariance components are similar between Veneto and Italy (see,
in particular, Table 3).
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The VWH data gather information on pay gross of taxes and inclusive of all
cash benefits, but they exclude all in-kind benefits. We choose log gross daily
wages, adjusted to the 2003 level, as the unit of measurement for earnings.
Other available alternatives (e.g. weekly or monthly wages) are less precise in
controlling for time worked since, by law, employers have to report all weeks
and months during which an employee has worked at least one day.
We have taken a number of steps that are relatively standard in the literature
using similar data. First, for each employee withmultiple jobs during the same
year, we have selected the longest spell in terms of months, weeks and days
worked; to break the few remaining ties, we have selected the spell with highest
earnings. Second, we have excluded from the sample all spells shorter than
approximately four months (16 weeks), and finally, we have trimmed wages at
the 1st and 99th percentiles calculated over a six-year period.
In the rest of the article, we study in detail the years from 1982 to 2001,
since our main purpose is to shed light on the determinants of the inequality
growth, which takes place during this most recent period. To estimate the
two-way fixed-effect model of Abowd et al. (1999), we have divided the 1982–
2001 years of data into five, partially overlapping, six-year panels. All the
results derived from the VWH database are computed considering only firms
of Veneto, but we have included employment spells outside this region in
the estimation sample of the two-way fixed-effect model. The rationale of
these choices is further discussed in the section providing the details of our
econometric method.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for each of the five panels that we
have constructed. It emerges that the composition of the sample is quite
homogeneous across periods. Given that public-sector workers, self-employed
workers and firms with no dependent workers are excluded from the social
security archives, the secondary sector is relatively large, and this pattern is
reflected in the occupational composition of the sample, where the majority
of individuals are blue-collar workers. Note that secondary sector is defined
asmanufacturing and construction, the primary sector as agriculture, forestry,
fishing and mining, while the service sector is defined as the residual category.
Tenure is left-censored at the year 1975, but, to correct for this problem, in the
empirical analysis, we control for this variable by including dummy variables
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics (Mean and St. Dev.) by Period
Period 1982–1987 1984–1989 1988–1993 1992–1997 1996-2001
Log daily wages 4.783 4.803 4.860 4.873 4.883
St. Dev. 0.286 0.300 0.332 0.343 0.352
Age 36.76 36.37 35.946 35.84 35.82
St. Dev. 11.07 11.04 10.90 10.39 9.85
Firms’ workers 7.599 7.272 6.958 7.443 7.398
St. Dev. 43.76 48.72 38.17 51.38 52.50
Tenure 5.072 5.551 6.015 6.453 6.479
St. Dev. 3.631 4.325 5.494 6.252 6.823
Proportions
Part Time 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.018
Apprentice 0.015 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.035
Blue Collar 0.730 0.729 0.723 0.724 0.708
White Collar 0.247 0.243 0.242 0.245 0.250
Manager 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007
Primary Sect. 0.043 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.042
Secondary Sect. 0.626 0.631 0.648 0.651 0.662
Tertiary Sect. 0.331 0.324 0.307 0.305 0.296
Total Workers 698,410 724,459 753,529 776,988 846,633
Total Firms 65,019 72,689 80,301 80,869 85,402
Notes: The sample is composed of firms located in Veneto belonging to the largest connected set.
Part-time contracts have been introduced only since 1985. Tenure is censored at 1975. Average
firms’ size is non-weighted and measured by the number of employees working for at least six
months in a year.
for its first six years, leaving higher seniority levels as the reference category.
The percentage of part time contracts is relatively low and it grows over time,
a tendency attributable to the fact that such contracts have been introduced
in the Italian legislation only since 1985. Finally, Table 1 shows that real
wages have been quite flat during the overall period considered, while their
dispersion, as measured by the standard deviation, steadily increases. In the
next section, we present a more accurate description of this trend.
Preliminary Evidence on Inequality
Figure 3 describes the evolution of log daily wages at the 10th, 50th and 90th
percentiles of the earning distribution. To be noted is that the 50th–10th and
90th–50th wage percentile ratios have all increased. Another finding is the very
flat growth of wage levels at the bottom of the distribution. In particular, men’s
earnings at the 10th percentile have remained stable over the whole period,
while median wages have risen by only slightly less than 10 per cent. Instead,
the 90th percentile of the pay distribution has risen by more than 25 per cent
in real terms, even if it stagnated during most of the 1990s.
In the left panel of Figure 4, using a method similar to Card et al. (2013),
we test the predictive performance of a series of log-linear conditional wage
models. To construct this figure, we have run year-by-year ordinary least
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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FIGURE 3
Evolution of Log Daily Wages at by Percentile and Year.
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squares regressions on the workers of firms located in Veneto, using different
sets of controls. The uppermost line represents the unconditional log wage
standard deviation. The other lines represent the root mean squared error
(RMSE) of the regressions. In each model, we have used the same set of
baseline covariates, namely: a quadratic term in age, occupation dummies,
tenure dummies, log of firm size (number of employees), around 30 sector
fixed effects, national industry-wide collective contract fixed effects and a set
of interactions (age with occupation and age with tenure).
In addition to these covariates, each regression model is fully saturated for
one of the following categories: (i) job titles (livelli di inquadramento), (ii) firms
or (iii) both. National industry-wide collective contract fixed effects are not
collinear with livelli di inquadramento, since the latter are specific job titles
(usually between 5 and 10 defined by the former. Instead, firm fixed effects are
collinear with sectors and, typically at least, also with industry-wide contracts.
The procedure adopted in constructing job title and collective contract fixed
effects is discussed in more detail in Section 5.
In general, the trend in residual wage standard deviation (RMSE) is fairly
flat, while total pay dispersion shows a clear increasing pattern. Therefore,
workforce composition and returns to its characteristics do much to explain
the rise inwage standard deviation over time because they become increasingly
relevant over time. Only a fairly small proportion of the unconditional wage
variation remains unexplained when we estimate a model fully saturated
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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FIGURE 4
Wage Standard Deviation and RMSE from Alternative Wage Models.
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for job titles and firms. Firm fixed effects explain a greater proportion of
wage variation than do job title fixed effects. However, when focusing on the
evolution of the RMSE across time, the same pattern does not hold. In order
better to compare the evolution of the relative performance of each of the
three regression specifications, in the right panel of Figure 4, we normalize
each year-specific RMSE to the 1982 level of the corresponding model. In
interpreting the graph, note that the absolute predictive performance of a
model has to be evaluated with respect to the unconditional wage variance.
The right panel of Figure 4 is useful in order to compare the relative predictive
performance of a model with respect to the others, but not the absolute one,
which indeed tends to grow over time for all specifications.
When considering the right panel of the figure, a clear pattern emerges,
because over time the explanatory power of fixed effects for job titles gains
importance with respect to the models where firm effects are controlled for.
Thus, we interpret this result as preliminary evidence of the importance of
collective bargaining in shaping the evolution of pay dispersion. In Section 5,
employing a more informative regression framework, we analyse this point in
more detail.
4. Decomposition of the wage structure using the AKM regression model
Econometric Methodology
The contributions of firm-specific, time-constant and time-varying
components of wages to raising inequality are identified by relying on
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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the higher dimensional linear panel model of Abowd et al. (1999) (we also
refer to this method as two-way fixed-effects model or AKM regression). In
order to make inter-temporal comparisons, we adopt the same strategy of
Card et al. (2013), dividing the years under study into different sub-periods.
Let i index a specific worker, t the time period and j = ι(i, t) the firm in
which i is working at t. Moreover, let yi represent a T × 1 vector of log wages
and xi a T × P matrix of time- and firm-varying individual characteristics.
Then, the two-way fixed-effects model can be specified as follows:
yit = xitβ + φ j + ηi + eit,
where yit and xit are rows of yi and xi and β is a P × 1 vector of parameters,
while φ j and ηi are, respectively, firm-constant and time-constant components
of individual wages, which are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with any of
the characteristics in xi , and which may not be perfectly observable. We will
often refer to ηi with the term unobserved individual heterogeneity, and to φ j
with firm wage premium or firm wage policy.
In the above equation, eit is the error term, which we assume to have an
expected value equal to zero in all periods. As in Card et al. (2013), we assume
that innovations in workers’ unobserved earning abilities (which enter in eit)
have mean zero for each individual, but contain a unit root. Match-specific
effects, which may arise due to productivity shocks associated with particular
job matches, are assumed to have mean zero for each firm and worker in the
sample interval. In the next section, we show that including match fixed effects
provides only marginal gains in the overall fit of the model, suggesting that
the size of these idiosyncratic components is quite limited overall. Finally, we
assume that eit is not correlated with any of the elements in xi , φ j and ηi . This
restriction, which we define as strict exogeneity, can be stated formally as
E
[
eit|xis, φ j=ι(i,s), ηi
] = 0 ∀ s, t.
The above assumption rules out any pattern of endogenous mobility of
workers between firms. Any realization of ι(i, s) = j should be uncorrelated
with ei,t, so that, for example, negative idiosyncratic shocks in wages should
not lead to mobility towards a certain type of firms. However, note that
correlation between ι(.) and ηi or φ j is allowed under strict exogeneity. If
this assumption holds, the model can be consistently estimated by OLS, via
inclusion of dummies for individuals’ and firms’ effects.
Card et al. (2013) develop several tests to support the validity of the
strict exogeneity assumption and the additive separability of firm and worker
effects. These tests have been conducted on German data (Card et al. 2013),
Portuguese data (Card et al. 2016) and also on Italian Social Security earnings
data, albeit for a matched sample of large firms only (above 50 employees,
see Macis and Schivardi 2016). All papers find no evidence in support of the
endogenous workers’ mobility hypothesis and conclude that the AKMmodel
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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provides a good approximation of the wage process. In an online Appendix,
we compute several of these tests on the VWH data, showing evidence that
does not support the presence of mis-specifications or endogenous mobility
patterns.
The baseline control variables included in the AKM model are a cubic
polynomial in age, a dummy for part-time workers, three dummies for
occupation, dummies for the first five years of tenure and a full set of time fixed
effects.3 To account better for the seniority profile of earnings, we interact the
age polynomial and tenure dummies with occupation fixed effects.
Workers’ fixed effects measure the personal earning ability that is constant
over time and is largely portable as individuals move to other firms during
their labour market career. Instead, firm fixed effects measure the extent to
which differences in wages paid by observationally similar employers matter,
keeping employee time-constant characteristics and other observable factors
constant. Unlike a simple average of the workers’ wages in the firm, φ j can be
interpreted as a firm-specific wage policy because the AKM model controls
for worker observed and unobserved heterogeneity, and hence accounts
for the potential non-random sorting of workers to firms. However, firms’
wage premiums cannot be directly interpreted as indexes of efficiency or
performance (Eeckhout and Kircher 2011). Nevertheless, since the focus of
this analysis is on the determinants of wage dispersion, rather than on firms’
performance variability, the parameter φ j is still highly informative for our
purposes.
There are several reasons why similar firms may adopt differentiated wage
policies. As highlighted by a large body of literature, firms may offer efficiency
wages (Akerlof 1982), or they may adopt a so-called wage posting behaviour,
offering higher wages in order to reduce the cost of vacancies (Burdett and
Mortensen 1998). Moreover, firms may differ in the degree of rent-sharing,
a phenomenon which Card et al. (2014) found to be small, but significant in
magnitude, in the labour market analysed here.
In the AKM regression, each firm wage effect is computed with respect
to an arbitrary reference category and, as shown by Abowd et al. (2002),
it is identified only by workers who changed at least one employer within
a given connected set. This is the group comprising all workers who ever
worked for any of the firms in the group, and all the firms at which any of
the workers in the group were ever employed. As in Card et al. (2013), we have
dropped observations outside the largest connected set of firms, a restriction
that implies the loss of an extremely small proportion of observations (around
1–2 per cent, depending on the period of observation).
The estimates of firms wage premiums may be biased whenever mobility
across workplaces is low and the entire workforce is not observable (Andrews
et al. 2008). For this reason, we report themain results only for firms located in
Veneto, that is, those for which we can observe all their employees. However,
firms outside this region are included in the regression, since otherwise we
would have a loss in efficiency due to the exclusion of observable job mobility
episodes from the estimation sample.
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Given the linearity of our panel model, and under the assumption of strict
exogeneity, the total variance of log wages can be decomposed as follows:
Var(yit) = Var(φ j=ι(i,t)) + Var(ηi ) + Var(xitβ) + Var(i t) +
+ 2Cov(φ j=ι(i,t), xitβ) + 2Cov(φ j=ι(i,t), ηi ) + 2Cov(ηi , xitβ). (1)
Thus, we can measure what are, among firm-specific, time-constant and
observable time-varying factors, the main drivers of wage dispersion, and
what forces lessen their magnitude over time. With the exception of the error
term, the effect of each component on the total variance is mediated by
the covariance terms. Of particular interest are the covariances associated
with firms’ pay premiums, since they measure positive or negative sorting of
workers’ earning ability into types of firms adopting specific wage policies.
The term Cov(ηi , xitβ) measures whether workers with higher wage
components related to observable time-varying characteristics exhibit higher
or lower time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. In practice, it is often
difficult to provide an economic intuition concerning which human capital
factors are absorbed by unobserved heterogeneity, and what drives the sorting
between time-varying and time-constant characteristics of workers, since to
some extent, Cov(ηi , xitβ) is also determined by how well given workers’ skills
are measured by the time-varying characteristics included in the regression.
Therefore, in presenting our results, we more often rely on the following, more
parsimonious decomposition:
Var(yit) = Var(φ j=ι(i,t)) + Var(ηi + xitβ) + Var(i t)
+ 2Cov(φ j=ι(i,t), xitβ + ηi ). (2)
In equation (2), the term Var(ηi + xitβ) captures the joint effect of workers’
time-constant and (observable) time-varying characteristics on the total wage
variance, conditional on firm-specific factors. The variability of the term
(ηi + xitβ) (which we also call workers’ portable pay component or workers’
wage premium) provides more concise information and has the advantage of
avoiding an often data-driven and arbitrary division of time-constant and
time-varying human capital factors. For this reason, the analyses that follow
often refer to this term only.
Variance Decomposition from the AKM Regressions
FollowingCard et al. (2013), we have calculated the variance decomposition of
equation (1) on five, partially overlapping, six-years panels.4 In each panel, we
have computed two-way fixed-effects regressions controlling for human capital
and aggregate shocks in wages. The coefficients associated with the regressors
included in xit were all significant and had the expected sign. The adjusted
R-squared ranged between 0.87 and 0.93.
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For each panel, Table A1 reports the detailed AKM wage variance
decomposition, as well as a comparison of these results with a model
saturated with match fixed effects. Notice that the fit of the latter model
is only marginally better, while the implied variance of match effects does
not contribute to the growth of pay dispersion, as it is relatively constant
across time. In other words, match components, representing additional
pay premiums or discounts specific of each worker-firm pair, are a modest
source of wage variability in the Italian context; thus, the additively separable
specification of firm and worker effects in the standard AKMmodel provides
a good approximation to the wage structure.
During the overall period considered, the total wage variance, as computed
on each six-years sample, has increased from 0.082 to 0.124, growing by
around 40 per cent. In each period, the largest contribution to the total
variance derives from the joint effect of worker heterogeneity, both observed
and unobserved. The variance of time invariant worker effects (ηi ) is always
higher than the variance related to time varying characteristics (xitβ).
Indeed, having accounted for worker- and firm-specific intercepts, only a low
proportion of overall variability in wages could be attributed to observable
time-varying characteristics in our model. Moreover, the covariance between
ηi and xitβ is always small and positive.5
Notice that the variance component related to firms’ pay premiums
provides a smaller contribution to overall wage dispersion than both
worker’s heterogeneity (i.e. the joint effect of time-constant and observable
time-varying individual characteristics) and constant individual effects.
Importantly, employers’ pay policies are more relevant in the first period
of the sample (1982–1987) than afterwards. Thus, firm-specific variability
in wages has a lower explanatory power than worker-level factors, and
its overall importance reduces over time. Finally, the estimated correlation
between firm wage effects and worker’s heterogeneity, considering both its
observed and unobserved components, is increasing over time. Hence, there is
a significant tendency towards more positive sorting of firms’ wage premiums
with workers’ overall human capital.
To show these trends more clearly, Table 2 reports the decomposition of
equation (2), computed in the first and in the last panel only. It emerges
that during both periods (1982–1987 and 1996–2001), the most important
determinant of total wage dispersion is the variance of workers time-constant
and time-varying heterogeneity (ηi + xitβ), which constitutes around three-
fourth of the total pay variance. The lower part of Table 2 shows the evolution
of earning dispersion from the earliest to the latest panel. For each pay
dispersion component, we have computed the difference across samples, the
percentage change and the contribution of this change as a percentage of the
growth in the total wage variance.
Between the 1982–1987 and 1996–2001 periods, the total wage variance has
risen by more than 40 per cent. Around 60 per cent of this growth is driven by
higher dispersion in our comprehensive measure of workers’ earning ability.
On the contrary, the dispersion in firms’ wage premiums declines between the
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TABLE 2
Decomposition of the Total Wage Variance Evolution
Period Var (φ j ) Var (ηi + xitβ) Var (eit) 2Cov(φ j , ηi + xitβ) TOTAL VAR.
1982–1987 0.032 0.064 0.008 −0.022 0.082
% of Total 39.0% 78.0% 9.8% −26.8% 100%
1996–2001 0.027 0.089 0.007 0.003 0.124
% of Total 21.8% 71.8% 5.6% 2.4% 100%
Difference −0.005 0.025 −0.001 0.025 0.042
%  −16.9% 32.7% −13.3% 263.2% 40.8%
% /TOT −11.9% 59.5% −2.4% 59.5% 100%
Note: Percentage changes for a given quantity z from t − 1 to t are computed using a reference
value zr defined as zr = |zt |+|zt−1|2 .
first and the last panels, providing a negative contribution of about 12 per
cent to the growth in wage dispersion. Finally, increasing assortative matching
between highly paid workers and better paying firms provides another positive
contribution to the growth in inequalities. This component represents around
60 per cent of the total trend, even if the correlation between individual
skills and firm fixed effect (φ j ) is relatively small and close to zero in all
sub-periods.
We interpret rising assortativeness as the result of at least two tendencies.
First, it is tempting to relate the growth in sorting to some changes occurred
in the Italian labour market and in its legislation since the 1980s. Like
other EU countries, in fact, Italy has experienced a general trend of labour
market modernization and liberalization that has affected virtually all aspects
of labour market regulations. This process may have gradually reduced
search and matching frictions, eventually improving allocative efficiency.
For instance, during the 1980s, manual workers had to be selected almost
exclusively from the unemployment workers’ lists maintained by the public
employment service, and not via direct selection mechanisms, because the
hiring process was fully liberalized only in the early-1990s. Similarly, in the
1980s, hiring typically involved only open-ended contracts, while temporary
contracts were gradually liberalized only from the second half of the 1990s
onwards (in this regard, however, note that the growth in sorting characterizes
also the years prior to this reform).6
A second set of potential mechanisms behind the growth in sorting is more
mechanical and linked to the growth in the dispersion of human capital.
In particular, a rise in relative wages of skilled workers may induce greater
sorting in a market where assortative matching is (slightly) positive to being
with. Moreover, since by construction, the measurement errors of ηi and φ j
are negatively correlated, and this induces a downward bias on estimates
of Cov(ηi , φ j ) derived from AKM-style regressions (Andrews et al. 2008), a
growth in the relative wage of skilled workers, by reducing the measurement
error of unobserved abilities, may induce a rise in the covariance term.
Unfortunately, with wage data alone, it is difficult to provide more nuanced
tests on the relative importance of the various mechanisms mentioned above.
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The issue of sorting, and of the determinants of its changes over time, is a key
area for future research.
In the next section, we discuss how changes in the industrial relations
system may have had a more direct bearing on the other two main findings
of the article, that is, declining dispersion in firm wage policies and positive
contribution of worker-specific wage components to the overall inequality
growth. To this end, it is useful to assess the experience of the second largest
manufacturing economy in Europe (Italy) in light of what has already been
documented for its manufacturing leader (Germany).
Wage Inequality and Institutions: A Comparative Perspective
Since we have used a sampling strategy and a method similar to the one
applied by Card et al. (2013) on German data, it is particularly interesting to
compare their evidence with that provided in our study. Moreover, in order to
test whether the case of Veneto can be considered coherent with tendencies
observed at the nation-wide level, we also compare our results with those
obtained by estimating an AKM variance decomposition on the nation-wide
visitINPS data.
Table 3 reports the decomposition of equation (2) applied to the VWH
sample, to visitINPS data and that derived from the results of Card et al.
(2013), considering comparable periods of time. It will be noted that the level
of the variance in Veneto is always lower than in West Germany and in Italy.
However, when considering the evolution over time, it emerges that male wage
dispersion increases at a fairly similar pace in the three samples. This result is
in part driven by the choice of the time period, as Card et al. (2013) document
a persistent rising trend in pay inequality until 2008, while evidence provided
by Figures 1 and 2 shows that in Italy, this growth lasted only until the early
2000s.
Table 3 shows that, remarkably, the determinants of inequality trends are
very similar in Veneto and Italy, but they are quite different when compared
with German results. Card et al. (2013) show that, considering differences
between the first and the last period, only 34 per cent of the total growth in
wage variance can be attributed to greater individual heterogeneity dispersion,
while the same amount is more than 60 per cent in the case of Veneto and
more than 70 per cent in Italy. Between the same periods, firms’ pay premiums
dispersion rose by almost 25 per cent in Germany, while it reduced by around
7 per cent in Veneto and 6 per cent in Italy. Finally, Card et al. (2013)
also find that the sorting between firm-specific and employee-specific pay
premiums contributed for another 36 per cent to the overall growth in earnings
inequality, which is a weaker figure than what we have documented for Italy
(42 per cent) and Veneto (55.9 per cent).
Card et al. (2013) link their findings, and, in particular, the growth in firms’
wage policies dispersion, to the major changes that occurred in the German
industrial relation system from the early-1990s onwards. As discussed by
Dustmann et al. (2009), rather than in legislation reforms, such changes were
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TABLE 3
Wage Variance Evolution in Veneto, Italy and West Germany
Veneto, Veneto working histories data, male sample
Period Var (φ j ) Var (ηi + xitβ) Var (eit) 2Cov(φ j , ηi + xitβ) TOTAL VAR.
1984–1989 0.029 0.068 0.008 −0.016 0.090
% of Total 32.2% 75.6% 8.9% −17.8% 100%
1996–2001 0.027 0.089 0.007 0.003 0.124
% of Total 21.8% 71.8% 5.6% 2.4% 100%
%  −7.1% 26.8% −13.3% 292.3% 31.8%
% /TOT −7.1% 61.8% −2.9% 55.9% 100%
Italy, VisitINPS data, male sample
Period Var (φ j ) Var (ηi + xitβ) Var (eit) 2Cov(φ j , ηi + xitβ) TOTAL VAR.
1984–1990 0.039 0.087 0.013 0.004 0.143
% of Total 27% 61% 9% 3% 100%
1997–2003 0.036 0.117 0.010 0.022 0.185
% of Total 20% 63% 5% 12% 100%
%  −7% 29% −27% 141% 26%
% /TOT −6% 71% −8% 42% 100%
West Germany, IAB Data, male sample (from Card et al. 2013)
Period Var (φ j ) Var (ηi + xitβ) Var (eit) 2Cov(φ j , ηi + xitβ) TOTAL VAR.
1985–1991 0.025 0.095 0.014 0.005 0.139
% of Total 18.1% 67.9% 10.2% 3.8% 100%
1996–2002 0.038 0.112 0.017 0.023 0.190
% of Total 19.9% 59.0% 8.9% 12.3% 100%
%  39.3% 16.6% 17.6% 125.5% 30.5%
% /TOT 24.6% 34.2% 5.5% 35.7% 100%
Note: Percentage changes for a given quantity z from t − 1 to t are computed using a reference
value zr defined as zr = |zt |+|zt−1|2 .
laid out in contracts and mutual agreements between employer associations,
trade unions and works councils. In response to the challenges of the post-
reunification period (e.g. increasing threats of firms’ offshoring and massive
migration flows), these actors allowed for an unprecedented decentralization
of the German wage-setting process after the early-1990s. Deviations from
industry-wide agreements through “opting-out,” “opening” or “hardship”
clauses were all increasingly used, even though the dominant system of
industry-wide bargaining basically remained unchanged. In this regard, Card
et al. (2013) observe that firms’ pay premiums, as computed on the 1996–
2002 sample, are disproportionally lower among establishments that had opted
out from national collective agreements, a tendency that enlarges the overall
dispersion in such wage components. Thus, in Germany, the growth in the
variance of firm-specific wage policies (Var(φ j )) was associated with a growth
in the share of workers not covered by any kind of union agreement and
to a rise in the number of firm-level deviations from industry-wide union
agreements.
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Italy’s system of industrial relations shares many features with that of
Germany, particularly as regards the importance of industry-wide collective
bargaining. However, in many respects, the Italian system has not shown the
flexibility exhibited by the German one, nor have the reforms that occurred in
Italy during the mid-1990s significantly weakened the influence of collective
bargaining on wage setting. Italian firms have never been able to opt out
from the industry-wide settlements, adjusting wages downwards whenever the
local or firm-specific economic conditions so required (see Section 2). This
may explain why, unlike in the German case, the variance of Italian firms’
wage policies has not widened over time, despite the fact that also Italy has
been exposed to the long-run challenges posed by the introduction of new
technologies and increased international competition.
Note that, according to our estimates, the variance of firms wage policies
actually decreased from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. Unable to deviate
from the industry-set minimum wages, Italian firms could still resort to
incremental firm-level wage bargaining to differentiate their firmwage policies.
Our data do not allow us to observe which firms or workers were covered by
firm-level agreements. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that the
incidence of firm-level agreements declined over time (e.g. Sestito and Rossi
2000), partly as a consequence of a reduction in unionization rates, as shown
for Veneto by Vaona (2006). The resulting standardization of compensation
schemes across employers is consistent with our finding of a decreasing
dispersion in firms’ pay policies.
Table 3 shows that the dispersion of observed and unobserved individual
heterogeneity has instead been a major contributing factor to the overall wage
inequality growth in the Italian case. While, in principle, this trend may reflect
the underlying labour market forces, for example, demand for and supply of
skills, in the following section, we argue that such market forces have been
largely “channelled” into the tight tracks set by the Italian system of industrial
relations, particularly through the sectoral-level bargaining process. We do
so by showing that the growth in individual heterogeneity dispersion has
been almost entirely driven by broadened differences in pay among the job
title categories (livelli di inquadramento) defined by industry-wide collective
contracts.
5. The impact of collective bargaining on wage and human capital dispersion
Variance Decomposition Method
This section shows that overall pay dispersion ismostly determined by between
job titles earning variability and it links this outcome to the evolutions
occurred within collective bargaining agreements. For this purpose, we have
applied a variance decomposition methodology that divides total variation
of a given quantity, which is partitioned into groups, into differences among
groups and differences among members of the same group.
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Keeping fixed a given period t, let yi j represent wages (or another quantity
of interest) of worker i in group j , let n be the total number of workers, let J
be the number of groups and let n j be the set of employees in group j . Define
y¯j as the average level of wages within group j , and define the within group
variance as
V j = (‖n j‖ − 1)−1
∑
i∈n j
(yit − y¯j )2,
where we indicate by ‖n j‖ the cardinality of the set n j (i.e. the number of
employees in group j ). Using the above notation, we can decompose the total
wage variance into a within group component and a between group component
as follows:
Var(y) = 1
n − 1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
J∑
j=1
(‖n j‖ − 1)V j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
within component
+
J∑
j=1
‖n j‖(y¯j − y¯)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
between component
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (3)
The next section presents results obtained by using livelli di inquadramento,
as defined by collective bargaining institutions, to partition the population.
Then we also apply the same decomposition using firms to define groups j in
equation (3). The discussion of potential mechanisms driving the respective
within and between components of the variance is provided in each of these
sections.
Since the term (ηi + xitβ) in the AKM regression model is one of the main
determinants of inequality, we have applied the decomposition technique
defined above to this worker’s portable wage component. For comparison,
we have also applied the same procedure to total wages. Note that when the
variance of totalwages is decomposed across time, the resulting trend provides
a composite effect, that is, it is the result of greater sorting, greater human
capital dispersion and relatively stable firms’ wage policies dispersion (see
Table 2).
Wage Components Dispersion Within and Between Job Titles
In the Italian system of industrial relations, the allocation of a worker to a
given livello di inquadramento is typically related to the tasks performed on the
job and to other time-invariant personal characteristics, mostly captured by
the fixed effect embedded in the workers’ portable pay component. The effect
of promotion to higher ladders of the scale, as well as the (fairly automatic)
seniority wage premiums stipulated at each ladder by the relevant collective
contract, are reflected in the time-varying component of the estimated
worker premium. Individual firms can affect pay differentials among livelli di
inquadramento only as regards the part above the statutory minimum wages,
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which are set at the industry-wide level. Moreover, by law, employers are not
allowed to downgrade workers into less remunerative job titles, an element
providing further rigidity in firms’ wage adjustment decisions.
Given this institutional context, the between job titles variance in workers’
portable wage components can be considered an informative parameter to
quantify the impact of collective bargaining on wages. A different measure is
proposed by Torres et al. (2013), who directly include occupation dummies
in an AKM model to study the effect of job title membership on wages.
However, in the Italian context, our approach is more suitable for studying
the influence of collective bargaining on wage dynamics, since the rules for
assigning each worker to a job title are set by the relevant collective contract
and can change over time. For example, several managerial occupations have
been regulated by autonomous industry-wide collective contracts since the
end of the 1980s. The resulting shift in the segregation of workers across
minimum wage levels defined by collective contracts raises challenges on how
to compare and interpret the variance of job title fixed effects across time.
Instead, the proposed variance decomposition, computed on a yearly basis,
makes it possible to capture to a full extent such institutionally-driven shifts
in the segregation of workers across various minimum wage levels.
Before presenting the decomposition results, we provide further
information on how livelli di inquadramento have been identified in the
data. As mentioned in Section 2, several economic activities, despite being
similar in their nature, can be regulated by more than one collective contract
and the number of such industry-wide agreements, as well as the number
of job titles defined by them, can change over time. Therefore, we have not
attempted to harmonize the definition of job titles across years. We have
instead considered the year-specific definition of livelli di inquadramento,
based on their classification code. As an inclusion rule, we have adopted
the criterion of considering as a legitimate job title only those for which at
least 150 observations were present in a given year in the largest connected
set of Veneto firms.7 The total number of livelli di inquadramento included
in the decompositions ranged between 435 (in 2001) and 520 (in 1984).
Moreover, the percentage of observations which we were able to include in
our decompositions ranged between 83 per cent of the total in 2001 and 69
per cent in 1986.
Figure 5 reports the results of the variance decomposition of wages (left
panel) and human capital (right panel) into a between- and a within-job
titles components applied year-by-year. Given that the sum of the two
series provides the total variance, the growth in the dispersion of raw wages
represents the composite effect of greater sorting of better paid workers to
better paying firms and of individual heterogeneity (see Table 2), while the
right panel of the figure gives the evolution of the latter component only. Both
graphs show that practically, all of the growth in the dispersion of wages and
of workers’ portablewage components is accounted for by increased variability
between livelli di inquadramento. Indeed, in the case of both unconditional
wages and individual heterogeneity, the between part of the total variance
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FIGURE 5
Unconditional Wage Variance and Workers’ Wage Premiums Variance Decomposition Within-
and Between-Job Titles.
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Job titles (livelli di inquadramento) are defined within each sector-wide collective contract. In each
year, we have selected only job titles represented by at least 150 workers in the largest connected
set of Veneto firms, including a total number of distinct job titles between 435 (in 2001) and 520
(in 1984).
FIGURE 6
Workers’ Wage Premiums Variance Within- and Between-Job Titles by Sector and Occupation.
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shows a growing trend, with the partial exception of the second half of the
1990s, while the within component is persistently flat. As a consequence, in
relative terms, this latter source of variation loses importance as a determinant
of overall inequality.
Figure 6 reports the evolution of between- and within-job titles workers’
wage premiums dispersion by sector (secondary and tertiary) and by broad
occupation (white and blue collars), computed by normalizing the 1982 levels
of dispersion to 100. A trend similar to the one implied by the right panel
of Figure 5 is observed for all categories of workers, but the growth of
between-job titles dispersion in human capital is considerably stronger among
production workers and in the secondary sector. In the next section, we show
that, even if the pace of growth in workers’ heterogeneity dispersion is different
across sectors, it is not driven by a handful of (secondary sector and low
skilled) industries. Indeed, as we discuss below, the growth in this component
of the wage variance is entirely driven by within-firms dispersion.
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FIGURE 7
Proportion of Workers Within Quartiles of the Job Titles’ Average Pay and
Skills Distribution.
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Two main mechanisms can explain the trend towards higher between-job
titles differences in wages. First, several collective contract renewals may have
enlarged the gaps between job-titles pay scales. Alternatively, firms may have
simply increasingly assigned employees to higher (lower) inquadramento levels,
as a way to raise (lessen) the base wage of workers. Below, we provide evidence
on the relative role of these two mechanisms. The left panel of Figure 7
shows the proportion of workers within each quartile of the job titles’ average
wage distribution, while the right panel shows the same statistic using the
average workers’ heterogeneity distribution. In constructing the graph, we
have computed year-by-year the average wage (or its portable component)
within each job title, separately considering workers in the secondary and
tertiary sectors. For each of these two sectors, we have classified each job title
according to the quartile of the job titles’ average pay distribution to which
it belongs. Then, we have computed year-by-year the proportion of workers
within each quartile group of job titles. Note that, since we have not weighted
this distribution by the number of observations within each job title, a given
percentile of the job titles’ average pay distribution can be quite different from
the same percentile of the wage distribution.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that the proportion of workers within each
quartile of the job title pay distribution has been fairly constant during the
overall period considered. There are some exceptions to this general trend,
but most discrepancies across time tend to be year-specific and small in
magnitude. Moreover, they may in part be attributed to differences in the
job title classification codes from one year to the other. The right panel of
Figure 7 shows that even when differences in employers’ wage policies are
controlled for in defining job titles quartiles, most tendencies remain similar
to the ones provided in the left panel. Overall, by analysing the composition of
job title categories across time, we can conclude that the main channel driving
greater wage dispersion is linked to differences in how the same occupations
are rewarded across time. Thus, there is no clear evidence of a process of
polarization of the workforce.
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To sum up, increased differences in minimum wage levels and seniority
premiums set for each livello di inquadramento are the most likely drivers of
the growth of Italian pay dispersion observed from the 1980s until the early
2000s. Indeed, almost all of the inequality growth has arisen from differences
in pay among these job titles. Still unclear is the extent to which institutions
have simply reacted to market forces, or whether they have represented a
distortion to the wage structure. Some hypotheses on the relative importance
of market-driven and institutions-driven mechanisms are further tested in the
next section, where we consider the role of workers’ segregation across firms.
Nevertheless, we can conclude that the growth in Italian wage inequality has
been allowed by the opening of the pay gaps between the various livelli di
inquadramento stipulated in a fairly centralized way at each industry-wide
contract renewal, combined with the gradual dismantling of the egalitarian
wage indexation system since the mid-1980s.
Wage Components Dispersion and Segregation across Firms
The growth of pay differentials among job titles, which we have just
documented, could also derive from a process of segregation of the more
qualified workers into given enclaves of firms. Such a market-driven process
would then probably be reflected in collective bargaining dynamics, given that
more skill-intensive firms could be able to grant better economic conditions
to selected groups of job titles. On the other hand, if this segregation
is low, despite a general growth in job title heterogeneity, we may think
that employers are constrained by the sectoral bargaining standards, given
that most of the growth in the dispersion of human capital occurs within
establishments, instead of across them. We test this hypothesis by computing
year-by-year the decomposition of equation (3), this time using firms as the
partitioning group of the population.
Figure 8 reports the within- and between-firms variance decomposition,
applied to wages and to the estimated individual heterogeneity of the
workforce. The left panel of the figure shows that raw wage variation is almost
equally split into a within- and a between-firms component. Given the results
that emerged from the AKM variance decomposition (see, in particular,
Table 2), the growth across time in the unconditional wage variance between
firms can be entirely ascribed to increased sorting of workers’ wage premiums
with firms’ pay premiums. Indeed, there is no evidence of increased dispersion
of firms’ pay policies.
In the right panel of Figure 8, we compute the same variance decomposition
using workers’ wage premiums alone, instead of total wages. This exercise
makes it possible to test whether the segregation of workers’ earning abilities
across firms has increased, or whether differences in this component of the
total variance have been growing mostly within workplaces and among co-
workers. It emerges that the dispersion of human capital between employers
has been persistently flat over the entire period considered. Therefore, we find
no evidence of greater segregation of workers’ skills across employers, as the
C© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Collective Bargaining and Wage Inequality in Italy 25
FIGURE 8
Within- and Between-Firms Decomposition of Unconditional Wage Variance and Workers’
Wage Premiums Variance.
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Worker’s wage premiums variance is defined as Var(ηi + xitβ). Since each panel that we have
constructed is partially overlapping, for each year, we report only estimates of Var(ηi +
xitβ) from the latest available period. For each year, the unconditional wage variance is
computed on the largest connected set in the latest panel. Only firms located in Veneto are
considered.
growth in the variance of this wage component is entirely driven by within
firms heterogeneity.
The low level of segregation in human capital across workplaces
documented here is coherent with the findings of previous studies on Italy
(such as Iranzo et al. 2008), but it is a quite peculiar result when compared
with evidence available for other European countries and the USA (see, e.g.,
Faggio et al. 2010 on the United Kingdom, Card et al. 2013 on Germany
and Barth et al. 2016 on United States). Overall, Italy is not characterized
by strong dispersion in firms’ wage policies, and the distribution of workers
has not shifted towards a more segregated structure, where successful firms
are able to attract the best employees, leaving out those who do not have
access to such networks. These two tendencies could have been relevant if,
for example, greater dispersion in productive performance across employers,
often considered an outcome of technological changes and international
competition, had induced greater heterogeneity in wages and workforce
composition between plants.
Considering the importance of pay dispersion among job titles, which is
documented by Figure 5, together with the evidence just presented, we can
conclude that the growth of Italian pay inequality has entirely occurred within
the collective bargaining framework. That is to say, over the years, the system
of industrial relations has granted more heterogeneous conditions for selected
categories of workers (i.e. job titles), while it has provided limited margins of
flexibility for firms. Arguably, the flat growth inwage dispersion observed from
the early 2000s until the most recent years (see Figures 1 and 2) could be the
consequence of more egalitarian tendencies within this institution, especially
given its important role uncovered by our analysis and the absence of major
reforms in wage setting mechanisms characterizing this period.
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6. Conclusions
In this article, we have analysed the evolution of Italian wage inequality
in the most recent decades. We have documented that, after a period of
strong wage compression taking place in the 1970s, there was a substantial
growth in several measures of pay dispersion from the 1980s until the early
2000s and a relatively flat tendency since then. To interpret this trend, we
have analysed the period of growth in wage inequality by decomposing the
wage variance into components capturing heterogeneity in firms pay policies,
heterogeneity in workers’ time-varying and time-constant characteristics, as
well as their sorting. We have relied mostly on matched employee–firm data
from the Veneto region, a large and self-contained labour market that shares
several characteristics with the most developed and manufacturing-oriented
Western countries. We have found that earnings dispersion has been mostly
driven by differences in the workers’ portable component of wages. Instead,
the variability of employer-specific pay premiums has diminished over time.
Interestingly, when we replicate our analyses on the recently released data for
the entire country, we find that the Veneto results are very similar to those
obtained for Italy as a whole, despite the large territorial differences that
characterize the country.
Our results are different from evidence documented for other countries,
and Germany in particular. In this respect, we have provided indirect support
for the conclusions of Card et al. (2013). These authors report evidence
of a growth in firms’ pay premiums dispersion. They attribute this finding
to firm-level deviations from the dispositions of industry-wide collective
agreements (e.g. the opting-out clauses), which were allowed by the German
system and became increasingly used from the mid-1990s onwards. We have
documented the lack of such a flexible adaptation process in a similar
manufacturing-oriented economy, which has undergone qualitatively different
reforms in its system of industrial relations. Italian firms have been unable to
apply heterogeneous pay policies, and to circumvent the constraints on wage
dynamics imposed by the sectoral level of bargaining.
To shed further light on the role played by collective bargaining in the
observed inequality trend, we have analysed the evolution of pay differentials
across so-called livelli di inquadramento, job titles defined by nation-wide
sectoral collective agreements, for which specific minimum wages apply
regardless of a worker’s union membership. A simple variance-decomposition
exercise allowed us to show that the increased dispersion in wages, and in the
workers’ portable component of wages, has almost entirely occurred between
such job titles.
In general, our results show that market forces have been largely
“channelled” into the tight tracks set by the rules governing the country’s
fairly centralized system of industrial relations. Collective bargaining can
also account for the episodic nature of the observed increase in inequality.
Our results suggest that minimum wage levels set at the industry-wide level
have become increasingly more dispersed during the 1980s and 1990s, and
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this has been the main mechanism driving the growth of inequality in Italy.
The most plausible explanation for why unions and other industrial relations
actors pursued such an opening-up of the wage differentials is obtained by
simply looking at the long-run evolution of wage inequality. During the 1970s,
the automatic wage-indexation clause known as Scala Mobile produced a
strong wage compression. This fostered resentment not only among top-paid
workers but also among those at the middle of the hierarchy (on this topic, see,
among others, Manacorda 2004). Our interpretation of the growth in wage
inequality that followed, between 1983 until the early 2000s, is as a sort of
“compensation” for the excessive compression of the previous decade. If so,
one would expect that, once the wages set in subsequent rounds of collective
agreements had reached the “desired” level of dispersion, the increasing trend
in wage inequality would flatten out, which is exactly what we document in the
article. After 2001 (and largely before the Great Recession), Italian inequality
has remained relatively stable.
Overall, there are some valuable lessons to be learned from our analysis.
First, the specificities of a country’s labour market institutions and industrial
relations system matter for the developments of wage inequality, and they
do so in more nuanced ways than typically emphasized by the empirical
literature. For the same reason, we should not expect that countries subject to
largely similar underlying market forces, for example, related to globalization
and technological changes, should exhibit the same increasing pattern of
wage inequality. Since Italy is the second largest EU manufacturing economy
and is characterized by wage setting institutions quite similar to those of
other important countries (e.g. France), we believe that the article presents
a notable case study. Our analysis also provides a method to test the relative
importance of collective bargaining institutions in shaping wage dynamics.
This method has the potential to be applied in several European countries
that are characterized by fairly centralized collective bargaining institutions.
Finally, we believe that important lessons can be learned from comparison
of the Italian experience with that of Germany, a country that — despite the
dominant role of industry wage-bargaining—displayed an unexpected degree
of flexibility and decentralization in its industrial relations system. According
to Dustmann et al. (2014), this factor has been important in boosting the
German economic performance after the early 2000s, albeit at the cost ofmore
wage inequality. In this regard, our comparative analysis informs the ongoing
debate on the relative merits and costs of decentralization of wage bargaining
in European countries.
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Notes
1. Other works on Italian wage inequality include Dell’Aringa and Lucifora
(1994), Erickson and Ichino (1995), Brandolini et al. (2002), Manacorda (2004),
Naticchioni and Ricci (2009), Devicienti and Borgarello (2001), Cappellari (2004)
and Cappellari and Leonardi (2016). Although they all emphasize the role of
Italian institutions and collective bargaining, none of them study the wage variance
decomposition based on the AKM method developed by Abowd et al. (1999) and
its evolution over time, because of limitations in the type of data that they use. AKM
models are estimated by, for example, Iranzo et al. (2008) and Macis and Schivardi
(2016), but their focus is not on the dynamics of wage inequality.
2. The Veneto data are freely accessible to researchers through the Fondazione
Rodolfo De Benedetti (https://www.frdb.org). The data covering the entire country
are only accessible to researchers holding one of a small number of competitive
VisitINPS grants. See the VisitINPS Scholars section at https://www.inps.it
3. Following Card et al. (2018), we identify all time effects by omitting the linear age
term and we include the higher order age terms in deviation from age 50.
4. By fitting separate models in each sub-period (even if partially overlapping), we
can measure long-run changes occurred in both returns to workers and firms
characteristics (changes in average prices) and sample composition across periods.
An alternative approach would be to estimate worker and firm fixed effects
interacted by sub-periods dummies. We have chosen the less computationally
demanding strategy adopted by Card et al. (2013), which provides a smoother
representation of the wage structure evolution across time and it eases the
comparability of our results. Finally, notice that, due to limited mobility bias (e.g.
Andrews et al. 2008), in general, there is a trade-off between the length of each
time period over which the AKM parameters are estimated and the precision of
such estimates, so that letting the panels be overlapped can be considered the most
consistent choice.
5. This is an indirect evidence that ηi and xitβ are separately identified. Indeed, as
suggested by Card et al. (2018), the presence of a strongly negative covariance
between these two terms is typically the outcome of an incorrect specification of
the time-varying controls of the model.
6. Fixed-term contracts were liberalized only after 1997, with the so-called Treu
reform, and then in 2003 with the Biagi law. An evaluation of specific labour market
interventions on sorting falls outside the scope of this article, and, in general,
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it would be difficult to conduct because there has been a constant flow of often
overlapping and across-the-board (i.e. for the entire private sector) reforms.
7. This inclusion rule has been chosen to mitigate measurement error issues which
are embedded in job titles’ classification codes. When computing the variance
decomposition using different thresholds, we did not find great sensitivity in the
results.
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Appendix
TABLE A1
Detailed Variance Decomposition of Log Daily Wages
Period
Var
(φ j )
Var
(ηi )
Var
(xitβ)
Var
(i t)
2Cov
(φ j , xitβ)
2Cov
(φ j , ηi )
2Cov
(ηi , xitβ)
TOTAL
VAR.
1982–1987 0.032 0.052 0.008 0.008 0.002 −0.025 0.004 0.082
1984–1989 0.029 0.052 0.009 0.008 0.002 −0.020 0.007 0.090
1988–1993 0.027 0.058 0.010 0.008 0.005 −0.010 0.012 0.110
1992–1997 0.028 0.061 0.010 0.006 0.006 −0.011 0.014 0.117
1996–2001 0.027 0.060 0.018 0.007 0.007 −0.007 0.011 0.124
Comparison of AKM and match models
1982–1987 1984–1989 1988–1993 1992–1997 1996–2001
AKM adj. R2 0.866 0.877 0.908 0.928 0.926
Match model adj. R2 0.886 0.896 0.922 0.942 0.942
Variance of match effects 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
Note: The estimation sample is composed of all workers in the largest connected set, provided
that they were employed for at least four months. The AKMvariance decomposition is computed
only for firms located in Veneto. The variance of match effects is estimated as difference in mean
squared errors between the AKM model and a match effect model (i.e. a model with separate
fixed effects for each worker–firm pair).
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